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I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to improve the living standards of the poor and to reduce inequality, the 
minimum wage policy has been proposed and implemented not only in developed 
but also in developing countries. However, the policy has been politically 
contentious among policymakers and controversial among economists, where 
the debate on the implications of wage floors persists. Although there has been a 
growing number of studies on minimum wage, most studies focus predominantly 
on its employment effects (see Brown et al., 1982; Card and Krueger, 1993; Neumark 
and Wascher, 2007). In fact, apart from the analysis based on the firm and labour 
market, households should be considered an important channel for explaining 
the effect of minimum wage policy, since household behavioural adjustment can 
generate substantial changes in the economy. In the view that households act as 
the supplier of labour, a household’s decision on educational investment—which 
affects human capital, and thus the quality of labour supplied—is an essential 
channel to explain the minimum wage effect. 
Neumark and Wascher (1994) find that the effect of minimum wage on 
employment is sensitive to the introduction of schooling control, highlighting the 
importance of examining the linkages among minimum wage, employment, and 
enrolment. Using US state–year observations between 1977 and 1989, Neumark 
and Wascher (1994) identify a negative influence of minimum wage on school 
enrolment and a positive influence on the proportion of teenagers neither 
employed nor in school. This adverse effect of minimum wage on schooling is 
also confirmed by a series of studies including Chaplin et al. (2003) for the US, 
Landon (1997) for Canada, Pacheco (2007) for New Zealand, and Rice (2010) for 
the UK. In contrast, Mattila (1978), using time-series data based on the US Current 
Population Survey, finds that minimum wage induces enrolment rates. Similarly, 
Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982) suggest that there is an increase in the educational 
attainment of white-teens from higher-income families as a response to minimum 
wage legislation in the US. Cahuc and Michel (1996) also show that minimum wage 
could positively impact growth by inducing more human capital accumulation, 
acting as a way of reducing unemployment caused by low demand for unskilled 
workers.
The limited research that attempts to address the relationship between 
minimum wage and educational attainment, as well as the lack of universal 
consensus among previous research, indicates a serious research gap in the 
literature (Cahuc and Michel, 1996; Chaplin et al., 2003; Ehrenberg and Marcus, 
1982; Landon, 1997; Mattila, 1978; Neumark and Wascher, 1994; Pacheco, 2007; 
Rice, 2010). Moreover, earlier research has some limitations, including the lack of 
variation in the minimum wage and potential endogeneity bias due to the inability 
to control for some explanatory variables (see Neumark and Wascher, 1994). Most 
existing studies were also conducted in developed countries, and only a few 
studies have been carried out in developing countries (Chaplin et al., 2003; Landon, 
1997; Pacheco, 2007; Rice, 2010). To the best of my recollection, there is no previous 
study investigating the impact of minimum wage legislation on the choice of senior 
secondary school type, particularly from a developing country’s perspective. 
Therefore, to fill this research gap, this paper investigates the relationship between 
minimum wage and educational (or human capital) investment—particularly on 
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choosing whether or not to attend school, and later the choice of the school type or 
the employment type—at the individual level, in the Indonesian context.
This paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it further 
investigates the indirect implication of minimum wage by introducing household 
decisions on educational investment. Second, by using a rich household survey 
from the National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas), this paper tries to capture 
minimum wage effects at the individual level, which may not be detected by state-
level regressions used in most previous research. Furthermore, this paper can 
be viewed as an effort to analyse whether the minimum wage policy supports 
or impedes recent Indonesian government efforts to promote school enrolment 
through its twelve-year compulsory education program1. It is worth noting that the 
government may be unaware of the possible interaction between different policies, 
especially in a developing country where inter-sectoral policy coordination is very 
limited.
Indonesia poses as an intriguing case study for analysing the effects of minimum 
wage for a number of reasons. First, although the first minimum wage legislation 
introduced in the early 1970s was neither binding nor enforced, the government 
implemented a new minimum wage legislation in 1989 and started to aggressively 
promote minimum wage policies as a vital labour policy (Hohberg and Lay, 2015). 
Second, the minimum wage setting’s responsibility is delegated to each of the 
34 provincial governments that revise their own minimum wage annually. This 
reform to the minimum wage, which occurred in 2001, has provided substantial 
variation in minimum wage data to investigate the impact of the minimum wage 
policy. Finally, Indonesia’s more decentralized political process for the past few 
years is expected to yield greater variation in regional policies, including those 
related to the minimum wage (Chun and Khor, 2010).
Because the theoretical predictions on the choice of school enrolment are 
ambiguous, empirical analysis is, therefore, necessary to untangle the complex 
theoretical relationship between minimum wage and school choice. This study 
pursues this objective using a large-scale annual household survey from Susenas 
as the primary data source. Specifically, using the survey data from 2000 to 2018, 
I construct a pooled cross-sectional dataset of individuals. The sample includes 
individuals who completed junior secondary education, and then choose either 
to attend senior secondary school or to drop out of school. The study utilises a 
nested logit model with controls for the individual- and household-explanatory 
variables to capture the possible relationship between minimum wage and choice 
of school enrolment. I find that the minimum wage legislation has a negative 
and significant substitution effect on educational investment. That is, individuals 
are more likely to drop out of senior secondary school as a result of a minimum 
wage legislation. Despite a positive outcome among low-income households, a 
regression incorporating an interaction term suggests that the substitution effect is 
still the dominant factor in explaining the effect of minimum wage.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the economic 
framework underlying the empirical approach, whereas Section III describes the 
1 Government Regulation (PP) No.47/2008 on Compulsory Education: https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/
Home/Details/4861/pp-no-47-tahun-2008
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data and methodology used in the estimations. Section IV contains the analysis and 
discussion of the effect of an increase in the minimum wage on school enrolment. 
Finally, Section V concludes the paper and provides policy recommendations. 
II. A SIMPLE TWO-PERIOD MODEL OF HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT
The economic framework, which formalises the relationship between minimum 
wage and choice of school enrolment, is based on a simple two-period model of 
human capital investment. This model is developed based on Acemoglu and Autor 
(2000) and Acemoglu and Pischke (2001), which are also inspired by Becker (1964) 
and Becker and Tomes (1986) theoretical models of investment in human capital.
Consider a household that consists of one adult and one child. In period one, 
an adult, who lives for just one period, works and earns income yi (either high-
skilled or minimum wage), consumes ci1, and decides whether to invest in his/her 
child’s education ei. The total cost—including the opportunity cost—of sending a 
child to school is θi, which varies with i as there is heterogeneity among children. 
Meanwhile, in period two, the child becomes an adult, has a child of his/her own, 
consumes ci2 and earns the wage of a low-skilled worker (minimum wage rate) 
if he/she did not attend school, wl, or the wage of a high-skilled worker if he/she 
attended school, wh.
According to the two-period model set up above, the utility of household i is 
given as:
(1)
where β is a parameter that measures how important future (child’s) consumption 
is to current consumption. Following the ‘separation theorem’ for human capital 
investment, the decision on school enrolment will be made simply to maximise the 
budget set of the household; hence, ei does not appear in the objective function. In 
the case of a perfect capital market in which the adult can borrow for his/her child 
with an interest rate r, the decision problem of the adult is therefore to maximise 
household utility subject to the household budget constraint, which is given as:
For an adult to send his/her child to school and to invest in his/her education, 
the following equation must be satisfied:
(2)
(3)
which asserts that the cost of schooling θi must be less than or equal to the net 
present value of the skill premium wh-wl obtained from enrolling at school.
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For this solution to hold, it should be noted, strong assumptions including 
a fully altruistic parent (the parent is willing to borrow to finance the child’s 
education or β = 1) and the absence of credit market problems (such as informational/
contractual problems) are required. However, in practice, credit market problems 
are prevalent, especially in the context of a developing country. In Indonesia, 
Johnston and Morduch (2008) find that, out of 40 percent of creditworthy poor 
households, only 10 percent recently borrowed from a traditional bank, suggesting 
a large gap between financial use and creditworthiness. In that case, it is important 
to take into account the credit market problems in the model setup. In this scenario, 
it is assumed that the adult is either unable or unwilling to borrow. Thus, saving 
cannot be negative or to simplify, saving is zero in both periods. This modifies the 
budget set as follows:
Furthermore, the utilities from sending and not sending the child to a school 
are given, respectively, by:
(4a)
(4b)




Besides the household’s optimality specified in Equation (7), another constraint 
on school enrolment decision is the condition that household income in each 
period cannot be less than the minimum subsistence level (Wongsangaroonsri, 
2016). The arbitrary minimum basket of consumption for a household is c̅i, which 
varies across households, to consider household-specific consumption preference. 
It is assumed that wl≥ci̅ and without access to the credit market, the household that 




As a response to an increase in the minimum wage, conditions (7) and (8) 
generate two opposing impacts on the choice of senior secondary school type. 
According to Equation (7), a higher level of minimum wage decreases the skill 
premium because it increases the wage of the low-skilled worker. As a result, the 
minimum wage legislation reduces the net benefit of sending a child to a school 
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and induces a child to drop out of school (substitution effect). On the other hand, 
an increase in the minimum wage causes the income constraint in condition (8) to 
become less binding; hence, the child will be more likely to enrol at school (income 
effect). In addition to the direct impact of minimum wage on wage (supply side), the 
school choice decision is also influenced by the indirect impact of minimum wage 
on employment probability. This impact also consists of two conflicting forces, 
depending on the labour market structure (demand side). Under the competitive 
labour market, the substitution of low-skilled for the high-skilled workers—due 
to an increase in the minimum wage—will increase the net benefit of investing 
in human capital and give rise to students’ enrolment at school. Meanwhile, in 
the monopsonistic labour market, the higher probability of getting a job reduces 
the incentive to invest further in education, thus inducing students to drop out of 
school.
Therefore, the total effect of an increase in minimum wage will depend on the 
combination of its impact on wage and employment probability. For example, if 
the substitution effect of the minimum wage is offset by a fall in the probability of 
obtaining low-skilled employment, the child will be more likely to enrol at school. 
Conversely, suppose the adverse effect on employment is small or the probability 
of employment increases. In that case, the increase in the minimum wage will raise 
the opportunity cost of going to school, and the child will be more likely to drop 
out of school.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Data Characteristics 
A large-scale annual household survey from Susenas, covering approximately 
300,000 households in Indonesia’s 34 provinces, serves as the primary data 
source for this paper. It contains a core questionnaire consisting of a household 
roster listing the sex, age, marital status, and the educational attainment of all 
household members. The survey is supplemented by modules covering additional 
information such as health care and nutrition, household income and expenditure, 
and labour force experience. Meanwhile, the macroeconomic variables, including 
the provincial nominal minimum wage, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price 
deflator, and poverty line, are obtained from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics. 
The provincial real minimum wage variable is created by dividing the provincial 
nominal minimum wage with provincial GDP price deflator in each year to index 
the variable in terms of 2010 rupiah. Besides, the household expenditure is adjusted 
spatially and temporally by multiplying the nominal household expenditure with 
the average national poverty line in the base year, and then dividing the result by 
the provincial poverty line.
Using the survey data from 2000 to 2018, I construct a pooled cross-sectional 
dataset of individuals. Our sample includes individuals who completed junior 
secondary education, and then choose either to attend senior secondary education or 
to drop out of school. Starting from 2015, the Indonesian government implemented 
the twelve-year compulsory education program, which was nine-year in the 
previous years. However, this program’s take-up is still meagre; the drop-out 
rate at junior secondary school is still the highest compared to other educational 
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levels (for instance, 51,200 students dropped out in 2017/2018 as reported by the 
Ministry of National Education and Culture2). Therefore, it is assumed that the 
schooling choice is made when students completed junior secondary school. In 
addition, the sample chosen for this study is individuals at the age of 15 to 21 
during the survey year, as these are the times when students are enrolled in senior 
secondary school. The choice of the lower age cut-off is in line with the definition 
of the working-age population, in which it is defined as those aged from 15 to 64 
according to the Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics. Meanwhile, the upper 
age cut-off is in accordance with the Regulation of the Minister of Education and 
Culture (Permendikbud) No.44/2019 Article 73, stating that one of the requirements 
for new student candidates for grade 10 senior secondary school high school 
is that candidates have to be at the maximum age of 21 years on July 1 of the 
particular academic year. To avoid endogeneity, individuals who migrated across 
the province are not included in the analysis as the migration might be motivated 
by incentives to pursue a higher minimum wage.
The dependent variable of this study is the choice of human capital investment 
after completing junior secondary school, which is categorised into two choice 
types: to attend senior secondary school or to drop out of school. Under the subset 
of “attending senior secondary school”, there are two choices: attending general 
or vocational senior secondary. Individuals attending general senior secondary 
schools are those enrolled in Sekolah Menengah Atas (SMA) and Madrasah Aliyah 
(MA), equivalent to general senior secondary school but under the Ministry of 
Religion’s management. Meanwhile, individuals attending vocational senior 
secondary schools are those enrolled in Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan (SMK) 
and Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan (MAK). On the other hand, within the subset of 
“dropping out of school”, there are two alternatives: work at a formal sector 
or not at a formal sector. Individuals categorised with formal employment are 
self-employed with unpaid family or temporary workers in the non-agricultural 
industry, self-employed with permanent workers, government and private-sector 
workers. Meanwhile, individuals categorised with non-formal employment are 
those working in the informal sector (self-employed, unpaid family workers, self-
employed with unpaid or temporary workers in the agricultural industry, and 
casual workers), taking care of the household, and doing other activities besides 
personal routines. 
The variable of interest is the log value of the annual real minimum wage, 
set at the provincial level. Some control variables included in the analysis are 
gender, age, marital status, and urban residency dummy. Household-level control 
variables in the analysis are mother’s and father’s highest educational attainment, 
household size, number of children in the household disaggregated based on age 
(1-5, 5-15, and above 15 years old), and the log value of real monthly household 
expenditure, disaggregated into food and non-food expenditures. To ensure the 
comparability of real monthly household expenditure variable across different 
family sizes, the value is divided by  in the sense that the marginal cost of living 
2 Indonesia educational statistics: http://statistik.data.kemdikbud.go.id/ 
3 Permendikbud No.44/2019: https://jdih.kemdikbud.go.id/arsip/Permendikbud%20Nomor%2044%20
Tahun%202019.pdf 
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is decreasing as the number of household members is increasing. Moreover, to 
reflect employment availability in the labour market, the estimation also controls 
for provincial level unemployment rate. These control variables at the individual 
and household levels are the case-specific variables for the first decision level 
in the nested logit model use in this study. Equally important, the share of each 
alternative at the district level poses as the alternative-specific variable, which 
varies among the bottom-level alternatives, the four choices that one could make 
after completing junior secondary school. 
As information about senior secondary school choice is only observed once 
during a person’s lifetime (unless the student has to repeat grade and transfer to 
another school), a panel dataset cannot be constructed, and a fixed effects model 
at the individual level cannot be used for the analysis. Besides, to the best of my 
knowledge, a plausible instrument for minimum wage is not available. Therefore, 
to limit potential sources of endogeneity in the regression due to omitted variables, 
it is crucial to control for as many predetermined or exogenous characteristics as 
possible. Despite these limitations, compared to pure cross-sectional and time-
series data, the independently pooled cross-sectional data offers some advantages, 
including more precise estimators due to the availability of more observations 
and the ability to trace the evolution of the dependent variable over time after 
controlling for confounders. Moreover, as the data is collected independently 
of each other across clusters, serial correlation of residuals is not an issue when 
applying the regression analysis.
B. Methodology
A nested logit model with controls for the individual- and household-explanatory 
variables to capture the possible relationship between minimum wage and choice 
of school enrolment is utilised for the analysis. This nested logit model allows 
for a non-zero correlation between unobserved components of choices within a 
nest and maintains zero correlation across nests (Heiss, 2002). Hence, this model 
relaxes the assumption of independently distributed errors and the Independence 
of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), which implies proportional substitution across 
alternatives, inherent in conditional and multinomial logit models by clustering 
similar alternatives into nests (Train, 2009). In this paper, an individual’s choices 
after completing Junior Secondary School (JSS) are grouped by choice type: to 
attend Senior Secondary School (SSS) or to drop out of school. The tree structure 
of an individual’s decision about what he/she wants to do after completing junior 
secondary school is presented in Figure 1. The tree diagram consists of two 
branches, labelled “Attend SSS” and “Drop out”, for the two subsets of alternatives, 
and each of the branches contains two twigs for the two alternatives within the 
subset. There is proportional substitution across twigs within a branch but not 
across branches.
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The nested logit model is estimated according to the following specification:
Figure 1.
Tree Diagram for Choices after Completing JSS
This figure shows the tree structure of an individual’s choices after completing Junior Secondary School (JSS), which 
are grouped by choice type: to attend Senior Secondary School (SSS) or to drop out of school.
Complete JSS
Attend SSS




The dependent variable schl_choicei,t is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of zero if an individual i drops out of school and one if an individual i enrols at 
senior secondary school. The independent variable is lnMWj,t, where MWj,t is the 
real minimum wage of province j at time t. Xi,t, Xh,t, and Xj,t are each vector of 
individual-, household-, and province-specific control variables. The parameters 
of the nested logit model are estimated by the simultaneous maximum likelihood 
technique, which, under fairly general conditions, generates consistent and efficient 
values of the parameters (Brownstone and Small, 1989). A positive value of the 
parameter π1 indicates that an increase in the minimum wage is associated with 
an increase in the likelihood of senior secondary school enrolment. Meanwhile, 
a negative value of the parameter π1 suggests that a hike in the minimum wage 
is linked to a drop in the probability of enrolling at senior secondary school, i.e., 
the individual is more like to drop out of school. The nested logit model in this 
study has two decision levels. In the first level, a type of choice is made—to enrol 
at senior secondary school or to drop out of school—and, in the second level, a 
specific alternative is chosen.
The nested logit model generalizes the multinomial logit model, allowing 
groups of alternatives to be similar in an unobserved way (Heiss, 2002). In the 
case of the two-level nested logit, as in this paper, it is assumed that there are J 
choices of alternatives {0,1,2,…,J} nested into S sets {B1,B2,…,Bs}. The conditional 
probability of choice j given the choice in the set Bs becomes:
(9)
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for j ∈ Bs, and zero otherwise. In addition, the marginal probability of a choice in 
the set Bs is as follows:
(10)
If ρs=1 for all s, then:
(11)
Thus, the implied joint distribution function of the εi,j is:
(12)
ρs indicates the degree of independence of alternatives within the nest, and 1-ρs 
is a measure of correlation within the nest. Meanwhile, between the sets, εi,j are 
independent, in which ρs=1. When all correlations are zero, the nested logit model 
becomes the standard logit model. 
The effect of minimum wage legislation on human capital investment relies 
on the firm’s compliance level. In this respect, the government of Indonesia makes 
efforts to ensure that minimum wage laws are binding. According to Law No. 
13 of 2003 concerning Manpower4, violating the minimum wage provision is a 
criminal offense and employers are threatened with a minimum of one year and 
a maximum of four years imprisonment and/or a minimum fine of Rp100 million 
(approximately US$ 6.8 thousand) and a maximum of Rp 400 million (approximately 
US$ 27 thousand). In addition to the law on Manpower, regulations regarding 
wages are also contained in Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) No. 
78 of 2015 concerning Wages/Remuneration5, Regulation of Minister of Manpower 
(Permenaker) No. 1 of 2017 concerning Wage Structure and Scale6, and Permenaker 
No. 15 of 2018 concerning Minimum Wages7. However, in practice, firms’ primary 
motivation to comply with the minimum wage legislation is the possibility of 
labour strikes, which could disrupt the production process and the possibility of 
consumers boycotting the firms, affecting the firms’ sales and revenue.
4  UU No.13/2003: https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Home/Details/43013 
5  PP No.78/2015: https://jdih.kemnaker.go.id/data_puu/PP_Nomor_78_Tahun_2015(1).pdf 
6  Permenaker No.1/2017: https://jdih.kemnaker.go.id/data_wirata/wirata-4-1-2017.pdf 
7  Permenaker No.15/2018: https://jdih.kemnaker.go.id/data_puu/Permen_15_2018.pdf 
(13)
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Figure 2.
Kernel Density of Monthly Salary/Wage Distribution, 2000 and 2018
This figure displays the kernel density of Indonesia’s salary distribution, as reported by Sakernas in 2000 and 2018. 
The evident spike in the salary distribution around the nominal minimum wage is observed each year, indicating that 
the minimum wage legislation, to a certain extent, has affected the salary distribution. This data is obtained from the 
National Labour Force Survey (Sakernas), 2000 and 2018.
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In addition, to ascertain that the regulation concerning minimum wage 
imposed by the government is binding, I performed further examination on the 
distribution of workers’ wages and how it interacts with the minimum wage level. 
Figure 2 displays the kernel density of the salary distribution in Indonesia, as 
reported by Sakernas in 2000 and 2018, which were chosen since the survey data 
used in the analysis are from 2000 to 2018. The national average of the nominal 
minimum wage is depicted by the red vertical line. In this case, an evident spike in 
the salary distribution around the nominal minimum wage is observed each year, 
indicating that the minimum wage legislation, to a certain extent, has affected 
the salary distribution. The proportion of workers who received wages above the 
minimum wage amounts to 91 percent in 2000. Yet, it decreased to 63 percent in 
2018, along with a significant increase in the minimum wage level. Despite firms’ 
imperfect compliance on minimum wage—since a proportion of workers is still 
receiving wage below the minimum wage—the evidence shown in Figure 2 could 
sufficiently become the foundation that allows the analysis using minimum wage.
IV. MAIN FINDINGS
A. Minimum Wage Effect on Choice of Senior Secondary School Type
Table 1 presents the effect of minimum wage legislation on the choice of human 
capital investment, estimated using Equation (9). Column (1) contains the estimate 
for the full sample, Columns (2) and (3) show the estimates when the sample is 
disaggregated by gender, whereas Columns (4) and (5) display the estimates when 
the sample is subdivided based on household income.
Table 1.
The Effect of Minimum Wage on the Choice of Human Capital Investment
This table reports the estimates using the nested logit model for the full sample and when the sample is disaggregated 
by gender and household income. Dependent Variable is the Choice of Human Capital Investment (0=Drop Out of 
School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All estimations include all the control 
variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Male Female Low Income
High
Income
Log (minimum wage) -.187** -.083 -.377** .207*** -.018
(.089) (.128) (.128) (.059) (.134)
Odds ratio .829 .920 .685 1.229 .981
Wald χ2 766.07 612.00 436.01 2992.19 395.93
Log likelihood -2039.51 -1162.79 -959.55 -12152.83 -1100.89
Observations 11,088 5,616 5,472 5,292 5,796
Based on the estimation using the nested logit model, the estimated effect of 
minimum wage is negative and statistically significant at a 5 percent significance 
level for the full sample regression. The coefficient of the nested logit estimation 
is in terms of log odds. When the outcome is converted to odds ratio by taking the 
exponent, it could be inferred that the odds are 0.83 to 1 (17 percent decrease in the 
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odds) that parents will invest in their children’s education with e (or approximately 
2.718) times increase in the minimum wage.8 This result suggests that an increase 
in the minimum wage is associated with lower odds to enrol at senior secondary 
school. The finding of this negative effect is also in accordance with the previous 
studies conducted by Neumark and Wascher (1994), Landon (1997), Pacheco 
(2007), and Rice (2010).
Furthermore, to capture gender differences in the effect of minimum wage, 
the sample is disaggregated into male and female. There is no significant effect 
of minimum wage for the male sample regression, indicating that deciding 
whether to attend senior secondary school is not influenced by the minimum wage 
legislation. Meanwhile, when the same regression is carried out using the female 
sample, the results indicate a negative effect of minimum wage on educational 
investment, which is significant at the 5 percent level. The odds are 0.68 to 1 (32 
percent decrease in the odds) that parents will invest in their female children’s 
education with e times increase in the minimum wage.
There are two possible explanations for this negative result in the female 
sample. First, the substitution effect could be dominant, as shown in Equation 
(7). Thus, a female child will have a higher probability of dropping out of senior 
secondary school as the minimum wage legislation reduces the skill premium and 
the net benefit of sending a female child to school. Second, the income effect could 
be larger than the substitution effect but then it is offset by a rise in the probability 
of obtaining a low-skilled employment; hence, an increase in the minimum wage 
is accompanied by higher odds of a female child dropping out of senior secondary 
school. 
Statistically, at the 5 percent significance level, the disaggregation reveals that 
the odds ratio among male children is 31 percent higher than that of female children 
to enrol at senior secondary school due to the minimum wage increase.9 This result 
indicates that female children are more likely to drop out of school and to start 
working, either in the formal or informal sector, as minimum wage increases. 
This could be explained by the entrenched cultural norms concerning women’s 
role in society, particularly in many developing countries. Besides, rooted norms 
on gender division of labour in which women are supposed to take care of the 
domestic work will most likely bias education investment towards males (Dreze 
and Sen, 1995; Davies and Zhang, 1995; Chen et al., 2009). In Indonesia, although 
there is no evidence of son preference in birth spacing, Kevane and Levine (2003) 
suggest that gender differences in educational attainment—particularly in senior 
secondary and tertiary education—and inheritance were quite prevalent in the 
recent past. 
Furthermore, the sample is subdivided by household income proxied using 
household expenditure data, which was timely and spatially standardised 
to generate comparable figures across time and province in Indonesia. This 
disaggregation is crucial to analyse possible differences in the effect of minimum 
8 The odds ratio is associated with a b-fold increase in the predictor, where b is the base of the logarithm 
used when log-transforming the predictor.
9 Odds ratio among male children is 1 because there is no significant result on the effect of minimum 
wage legislation on senior secondary school enrolment. Hence, in this case, the condition whether to 
attend senior secondary school is equally likely to occur.
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wage between low-income and high-income households in the sample. The 
intuition is that the effect of the positive income shock would be more likely to affect 
households with income below the minimum wage rate. Conversely, households 
with income that lies well above the minimum wage rate should experience none 
or comparatively smaller effect on their income. For this purpose, a low-income 
household is defined as a household that receives real monthly income less or 
equal to the equivalent value of 800,000 rupiahs in 2010, while any household 
with income above this threshold is defined as a high-income household. This 
subdivision threshold is also consistent with the average of the real minimum 
wage in 2010, which is 845,707 rupiah. We separately run the regression based 
on household income status, and present the results in Columns (4) and (5). The 
estimate of minimum wage effect is negative for individuals in the high-income 
households and yet positive for individuals in low-income households.
According to the estimates using the nested logit model, the estimated effect of 
minimum wage is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent significance 
level for the low-income sample regression. If it is interpreted using the odds 
ratio, I could conclude that the odds are 1.22 to 1 (22 percent increase in the odds) 
that parents will invest in their children’s education with e times increase in the 
minimum wage. Meanwhile, when the same regression is carried out using the 
high-income sample, I find no significant effect of minimum wage on educational 
investment. The significant positive effect of minimum wage legislation among 
the low-income households indicates that an increase in the minimum wage is 
associated with a higher probability to enrol at senior secondary school. This 
result is in accordance with the theoretical prediction that the budget constraint in 
condition (8) is more likely to be binding for the low-income households; hence a 
positive income shock will make it less binding resulting in a higher probability 
of investing in senior secondary education. Moreover, the result is also consistent 
with the intuition that individuals in households at the lower end of the income 
distribution are more sensitive to an increase in the minimum wage. 
Nevertheless, among the low-income households, it cannot be concluded 
that the income effect is the dominant factor (relative to the substitution effect) as 
this positive result may be generated by a fall in the probability of obtaining low-
skilled employment that offset the substitution effect. In other words, if the labour 
market in Indonesia is assumed to be competitive, as suggested by Suryahadi 
et al. (2003) that firms substituted low-skilled workers for high-skilled workers, 
the dominant substitution effect (i.e., to drop out of school) may be superseded 
by the lower probability of employment due to a higher minimum wage. As a 
result, the probability of enrolling in senior secondary school is higher. In this 
regard, Cameron and Alatas (2003), using census data from all medium and 
large Indonesian firms, find evidence of an adverse employment impact for small 
domestic firms but no employment impact for large firms—foreign or domestic. 
This result indicates that smaller firms, in particular, operate in a competitive 
labour market in Indonesia.
Although minimum wages may not directly affect low-income households 
since a significant proportion of them is engaged in the informal sector10, empirical 
10 According Sakernas 2019, more than 55 percent of workers in Indonesia are involved in informal 
sector employment. This rate is higher among poor workers, approximately 65 percent of workers 
with income in the bottom 20 percent work in the informal sector.
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studies reveal that they play a significant role. As an instance, a study by Khamis 
(2013) finds that the rise in the minimum wage has had only a minor effect on the 
formal sector in Argentina but has improved wages in the informal sector. This 
result indicates that the common practice of non-compliance with labour laws 
and standards in the informal economy does not necessarily imply that minimum 
wages do not affect. The rationale for the influence of minimum wages on wages 
received by informal workers has been the “lighthouse effect” —i.e., a signal 
given by the minimum wage legislation to workers and employers in the informal 
economy regarding socially acceptable minimum levels of pay (Souza and Baltar, 
1979; Bell, 1999). In line with this, a field investigation in Indonesia conducted by 
Widarti (2006) observes that the wage system in the informal sector uses wage 
references in the regions’ similar businesses; therefore, wages for most workers 
in the informal sector are clustered around the minimum wage standards at the 
provincial level.
B. Separating the Substitution and Income Effects
Determining the magnitude of substitution and income effect is also of interest 
in analysing the effect of minimum wage on educational investment. Several 
additional assumptions underlying this identification are needed. First, the 
magnitude of the substitution effect is symmetric across low-income and high-
income households. Second, as the effect of the positive income shock is more 
likely to affect households with income below the minimum wage rate, the income 
effect is assumed to affect only low-income households; and, third, the labour 
market is competitive so that an increase in the minimum wage is followed by an 
adverse effect in employment. To determine the size of substitution and income 
effects, I estimate the following regression:
Low Incomei,t is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the household is 
classified as low income (i.e. receiving real monthly income less or equal to the 
equivalent value of 800,000 rupiahs in 2010) and 0 if otherwise. According to 
Equation (14), π1 will capture the common effect of minimum wage across all 
households. Meanwhile, π3, the coefficient of the interaction term, will capture the 
additional effect of minimum wage specific to the low-income household. Given 
the aforementioned assumptions, π1 will capture the substitution effect for both 
households, and thus the sign is expected to be negative, whereas π3 will capture 
the income effect for low-income households, and the sign should be positive. 
(14)
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Based on the regression specified in Equation (14), Table 2 shows that the 
coefficient of log real minimum wage is negative, whereas the coefficient of the 
interaction term is insignificant. From these results, it can be inferred that the 
substitution effect is dominant for both households, whereas the income effect is 
non-existent for low-income households. Hence, the positive and significant effect 
of an increase in minimum wage among low-income households, presented in 
Column (4) of Table 1, is more likely to be associated with a fall in the probability 
of obtaining a low-skilled employment that offset the substitution effect, rather 
than with the income effect on its own.
C. Standard Logit or Nested Logit Model
In order to check whether a nested logit model provides an accurate representation 
of the substitution pattern, I performed hypothesis tests on the correlations within 
a nested logit model (Train, 2009). When all correlations are zero, the generalised 
extreme value distribution becomes the product of independent extreme value 
distributions, and the nested logit model becomes a standard logit model. In 
contrast, if there are correlations over alternatives, the nested logit model is the 
appropriate model to be used for the analysis.
The coefficient on the inclusive value (ρs), sometimes called the log-sum 
coefficient or the dissimilarity parameter, reflects the degree of independence 
among the unobserved portions of utility for the alternatives in each nest. A high 
value of ρs means greater independence and less correlation, i.e., the alternatives 
in the nest are less similar for unobserved reasons. For a nested logit model to 
be consistent with utility-maximising behaviour, it must be the case that 0<ρs<1 
for all s. A negative value of ρs is inconsistent with utility maximisation since 
it implies that improving the attributes of an alternative actually decreases the 
probability that it will be chosen. In general, the estimated log-sum coefficient that 
is outside the (0,1] bound suggests a misspecification problem with the model, in 
which either the systematic component, the grouping, or both could be incorrectly 
specified. Table 3 exhibits that the log-sum coefficients in all nested logit model 
specifications satisfy 0<ρs<1 for all s. Thus, it can be inferred that there is no 
misspecification problem with the model. 
Table 2.
Alternative Specification with Interaction Term
This table reports the results using the nested logit model with an interaction term. All estimations include all the 
control variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects. Dependent Variable is the Choice 
of Human Capital Investment (0=Drop Out of School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School)
Coefficient Standard Error z P >|z|
Log (minimum wage) -0.126 0.026 -4.91 0.000
Low Income 2.538 5.968 0.43 0.671
Low Income* Log (minimum wage) -0.202 0.416 -0.49 0.627
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In addition, to check whether the model has complete independence and the 
nested logit reduces to a standard logit model, a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) test is 
conducted with the null being that ρs=1 for all s. In the case of this paper, the LR 
test results in Table 3 show that the null that all of the dissimilarity parameters 
are 1 can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level for all of the nested logit 
model specifications. This indicates that the nested logit model is, in fact, more 
appropriate to estimate the effect of minimum wage on educational investment 
as compared to the standard logit model, especially when the type of senior 
secondary school and employment pose as alternatives that one has to choose. 
The joint test that ρs=1 for all s can also be seen as a test of the IIA assumption. 
If ρs=1 for all s, which means that the IIA holds, then it is appropriate to use 
the standard logit model. Nevertheless, the LR test result should be used with 
caution as it will depend on exactly how the decision tree is specified. In other 
words, different specifications of the decision tree can lead to conflicting results. 
Therefore, Hausman’s (1978) specification test can be used to test for IIA, because 
this test is not be sensitive to the tree structure specified in the nested logit model. 
Table 3 also reports Hausman’s specification test results, which indicate that IIA 
does not hold, and thus it is appropriate to use the nested logit model.
D. Disaggregation into High- and Low-income Household
The regressions for low- and high-income households presented in Table 1 use 
the sample disaggregated by the equivalent value of Rp 800,000 in 2010 cutoff, 
an arbitrary threshold set to examine the heterogeneity of minimum wage 
effect based on the household income. To check for robustness, this section 
repeats the regression done in Columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 using different 
sample subdivisions. Table 4 presents the estimates of minimum wage effect on 
educational investment when the sample is disaggregated into three groups based 
on household income distribution.
Table 3.
Dissimilarity Parameters, LR Test, and Hausman Test for IIA
This table reports the dissimilarity parameters, LR test, and Hausman Test for IIA for the full sample and when the 
sample is disaggregated by gender and household income. Dependent Variable is the Choice of Human Capital 
Investment (0=Drop Out of School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity 
are in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All 












ρSenior Secondary School .624 .668 .716 .770 .653
ρDrop Out .332 .436 .249 .407 .358
LR test for IIA
(H0: ρs=1 ∀ s)
26.55*** 36.72*** 61.59*** 98.44*** 26.93***
Hausman test for IIA
(H0: ρs=1 ∀ s)
42.38*** 44.88*** 94.37*** 468.14*** 33.00***
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The threshold for the 5th percentile of household income distribution is the 
equivalent value of Rp 817,165 in 2010, whereas the 25th and 50th percentiles of 
the distribution are the equivalent values of Rp 1,287,747 and Rp 1,796,012 in 
2010, respectively. Column (1) shows that the minimum wage legislation has a 
significant positive effect on educational investment. In other words, an increase in 
minimum wage induces enrolment in senior secondary school among individuals 
in low-income households, particularly those with income below 5 percent of the 
distribution. Using the odds ratio, I could conclude that the odds are 1.252 to 1 
that parents will invest in their children’s education with e times increase in the 
minimum wage. Conversely, Columns (2), (3), and (4) display that there is no 
significant effect of minimum wage on educational investment. This is consistent 
with the regression estimates for low- and high-income households in Table 1, 
indicating that the significant positive effect of minimum wage among the low-
income households is mostly driven by individuals whose household incomes are 
at the 5th percentile of the distribution, which is equal to the average value of real 
minimum wage in 2010.
E. Construction of Provincial Real Minimum Wage Variable
One could use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) or the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) deflator to adjust nominal values to real values. Although it may seem that 
both measure the same thing at first glance, there are a few key differences. The 
first is that the GDP deflator includes only domestic goods and not anything that 
is imported, whereas the CPI includes anything bought by consumers, including 
foreign goods. The second difference is that the GDP deflator is a measure of the 
prices of all goods and services, whereas the CPI is a measure of only goods bought 
by consumers. Therefore, this section presents a robustness check, which entails 
constructing the provincial real minimum wage variable using CPI as a deflator, 
rather than the GDP deflator.
Table 4.
Estimation of Minimum Wages Effect on Educational Investment 
Based on the Household Income Distribution
This table reports the results using the nested logit model for the full sample and when the sample is disaggregated 
by gender and household income. Dependent Variable is the Choice of Human Capital Investment (0=Drop Out of 
School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All estimations include all the control 
variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HH income ≤ 
5th percentile
HH income ≤ 
25th percentile
25th percentile >
HH income ≤ 
50th percentile
HH income > 
50th percentile
Log (Minimum Wages) 0.249*** -0.115 -0.0415 -0.0533
(0.0700) (0.0830) (0.104) (0.203)
Odds ratio 1.282 .891 .959 .948
Wald χ2 2174.49 1141.14 1265.23 454.46
Log likelihood -8695.10 -4332.77 -5005.53 -975.97
Observations 2,439 2,772 2,661 3,216
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The national CPI data in Indonesia is constructed based on CPI data available 
at the city or district level, which represents all provinces in Indonesia. The number 
of cities used to survey the cost of living has increased across the years. In 2000, 
the CPI was based on surveys in 44 cities; then, it became 45 cities in 2004, 66 
cities in 2008, and 82 cities in 2014. Although there is no CPI data at the provincial 
level, I construct the provincial level CPI using data at the city and district level 
by weighting cities that represent the province based on their GDP relative to 
the provincial GDP. Table 5 presents the estimates of the minimum wage effect 
on educational investment, where the provincial real minimum wage variable is 
constructed by dividing the provincial nominal minimum wage with the value of 
provincial CPI each year to index the variable in terms of 2010 rupiah.
Based on the estimates using the nested logit model, the estimated effect 
of the minimum wage is negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent 
significance level for the full sample. It could be inferred that the odds are 0.83 
to 1 (17 percent decrease in the odds) that parents will invest in their children’s 
education with e times increase in the minimum wage. Meanwhile, when the 
sample is disaggregated according to gender, the male sample regression 
estimates do not show any significant effect of minimum wage on educational 
investment. However, among the female sample, there is evidence that a higher 
minimum wage is linked to the likelihood of dropping out of school, significant 
at the 5 percent significance level. The odds are 0.74 to 1 (26 percent decrease in 
the odds) that parents will invest in their female children’s education with e (or 
approximately 2.718) times increase in the minimum wage.
Furthermore, according to the household income disaggregation, the estimated 
effect of minimum wage is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
significance level among low-income households. Using the odds ratio, I could 
conclude that the odds are 1.33 to 1 (33 percent increase in the odds) that parents 
will invest in their children’s education with e times increase in the minimum 
wage. Meanwhile, when the same regression is carried out using the high-income 
Table 5.
The Effect of Minimum Wage on the Choice of Human Capital Investment
This table reports the results using the nested logit model for the full sample and when the sample is disaggregated 
by gender and household income. Dependent Variable is the Choice of Human Capital Investment (0=Drop Out of 
School; 1= Enrol at Senior Secondary School). Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All estimations include all the control 
variables described in Section III as well as year and province fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Male Female Low Income
High 
Income
Log (minimum wage) -.182* -.088 -.300** .287*** -0.107
(.106) (.137) (.152) (.076) (.228)
Odds ratio .833 .914 .740 1.332 0.898
Wald χ2 702.50 319.38 409.41 2171.33 251.55
Log likelihood -1794.43 -1011.75 -860.49 -8737.72 -616.28
Observations 11,088 5,616 5,472 5,292 5,796
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sample, there is no significant effect of minimum wage on educational investment. 
The significant positive effect of minimum wage legislation among the low-income 
households indicates that an increase in the minimum wage is associated with a 
higher probability to enrol at senior secondary school.
As explained in Section III, the provincial real minimum wage variable in 
this paper is created by dividing the provincial nominal minimum wage with the 
provincial GDP price deflator in each year to index the variable in terms of 2010 
rupiah. However, the robustness-check regression results show no significant 
differences between using the provincial GDP deflator and the CPI to convert 
minimum wage to real terms. Both show significant positive effects of the 
minimum wage increase on the odds of senior secondary school enrolment among 
the low-income households, and significant negative effects for the full sample. 
Moreover, the size of the odds ratio between the two types of regressions suggests 
no significant dissimilarity.
F. Discussion and Limitations
In a pooled cross-sectional data setting, one is unable to fully control for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics like in a panel data setting. As a result, 
both the time-variant and invariant unobservable characteristics, which affect 
the school choice, will lead to endogeneity bias if they are correlated with the 
independent variables and are not directly controlled. Therefore, in this paper, 
whenever possible, both the time-variant and invariant factors that have the 
potential to cause endogeneity bias are controlled. Nevertheless, data on some 
important control variables are unavailable, including data on the direct cost of 
senior secondary education and a proxy for education quality, such as teachers’ 
salaries or the student-teacher ratio. There is a concern that the minimum wage 
variable might be correlated with these unobservable factors, which would then 
determine educational investment and lead to possible endogeneity bias. For 
instance, if the direct cost of senior secondary education is positively correlated 
with minimum wage, as this cost is part of the decent living standard consumption 
bundle determining the minimum wage rate, the coefficient of the minimum wage 
variable will be biased upwards. Given the availability of data on these control 
variables, this could improve the precision of the estimates in this paper. 
Here, the parameters of the nested logit model are simultaneously estimated 
using the standard maximum likelihood technique. Although maximisation using 
maximum likelihood is sometimes challenging because the log-likelihood function 
is not globally concave and even in concave areas is not close to a quadratic, the 
nested logit model results are consistent (Brownstone and Small, 1989). With 
simultaneous estimation, the nested logit model’s parameters are efficient since all 
information is utilised in the estimation of each parameter, and parameters that are 
common across components are necessarily constrained to be equal (Train, 2009). 
Nevertheless, in some cases, if problems arise in the simultaneous estimation, 
nested logit models can be estimated in a sequential manner, which is performed 
“bottom-up”. However, conforming to Train (2009), the sequential estimation of 
nested logit models, while consistent, is not as efficient as simultaneous estimation 
by maximum likelihood. In the case of the nested logit model in this paper, there 
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is no problem in the simultaneous estimation, and the log-likelihood has a unique 
global maximum. Therefore, there is little reason to sequentially estimate the 
nested logit model.
V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper shows that Indonesia’s minimum wage legislation has a significantly 
negative effect on educational investment. Individuals are more likely to drop 
out of senior secondary school following an increase in the minimum wage. 
The estimates indicate that female children are more likely to drop out of school 
and start working, either in the formal or informal sector, as the minimum wage 
increases. Furthermore, after disaggregating the sample by household income, 
I document that an increase in the minimum wage has no effect on education 
investment for individuals in high-income households, whereas it has a positive 
effect for individuals in low-income households. Nevertheless, using these income-
division results alone, I cannot conclude that the income effect is the dominant 
factor among low-income households since the positive effect of minimum wage 
may be generated by a fall in the probability of obtaining low-skilled employment 
that offset the substitution effect. Therefore, to separate the substitution and 
income effects, I estimate a regression incorporating an interaction term. The 
results suggest that the substitution effect is the dominant factor in explaining the 
effect of minimum wage legislation on human capital investment, both for low- 
and high-income households. This dominant and negative substitution effect is 
also discovered in most studies analysing the impact of minimum wage on human 
capital investment, such as Neumark and Wascher (1994), Landon (1997), Pacheco 
(2007), and Rice (2010).
This study shows that low-income households, particularly those with income 
below 5 percent of the distribution, are more sensitive to changes in the minimum 
wage. A positive income shock through an increase in the minimum wage for 
the low-income household would make their budget constraint less binding, 
resulting in a higher probability of investing in senior secondary education. 
However, a positive income shock is not only in the form of an increase in the 
minimum wage but may also be in the form of social assistance distributed to 
ease households’ expenses. Therefore, to preserve the positive response among 
low-income household, active government policy is critical to support poor 
households to invest in their human capital, instead of saving for precautionary 
reasons. In addition, the government should also ensure adequate coverage and 
benefit levels of social assistance as they are vital in protecting human capital and 
building resilience. Moreover, a well-functioning, adaptive, and responsive social 
protection system is a prerequisite to protect poor and vulnerable households 
against risks and shocks along the lifecycle. Such social protection system would 
minimise negative coping behaviours (e.g., giving up productive investment in 
order to maintain basic minimum consumption) and contribute to beneficiaries’ 
human and financial capital in the long run.
Besides, the empirical results in this study suggest that an increase in the 
minimum wage thwarts recent government efforts to promote student enrolment 
in senior secondary school. Consequently, the impact on human capital investment 
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decisions of individuals should be taken into account when considering the costs 
and benefits of introducing or raising the minimum wage. Policy interventions 
may be crucial to encourage students to complete senior secondary school, mainly 
to counteract the negative impact of the minimum wage legislation on educational 
investment and to avert the negative consequences in terms of long-run economic 
development of labour force with a low level of human capital. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the success of a government programme will depend at least 
in part on other programmes. Therefore, inter-sectoral policy coordination should 
be improved to enable synergy or at least prevent overlapping and conflicts of 
sectoral policies, which is increasingly vital due to the growing complexity of 
many policy issues. The government needs to identify and mitigate divergences 
between sectoral priorities and policies and promote mutually supporting actions 
across sectors and institutions.
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